Darrell J. Donohue v. Margaret Rolando : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1964
Darrell J. Donohue v. Margaret Rolando : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Hanson & Garrett; Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent;
Rawlings, Wallace, Roberts & Black; S. V. Litizette; Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Donohue v. Rolando, No. 10079 (Utah Supreme Court, 1964).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/4515
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
ofthe ~o 
STATE OF ~ JU~ _;64 
-----------------------------------c~~ri: ut·h 
_____ ...... ---· uprerne 








Appeal from the Seventh District Court for Carbon County 
Honorable F. W. Keller, Judge 
RAWLINGS, WALLACE, ROBERTS & BLACK 
S. V. LITIZETTE 
530 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
HANSEN & GARRETT 
Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Respondent 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
}>age 
Sri'.\'1'~~:\It~:x'r ()}, 1\:IXIl 0~_, l~.t\SE________________ 3 
I > I S P ( > S l 'r I < > X I :\' I j 0 \ \r E R l, 0 l ~ I { T ___ .. __ . _ _ _ _ ~ 
H ~~ L I J1~ 1~, S() t T ( i 11 'r ox 1\I> I>EAL ____________________ 4 
s'r"\'f~~~IJ1:~'r <>I~, ~-,i\l,rs ---------------------------------- ~ 
P<>I~'r I. 'rii~~ 'fRI1\I_J COURT (:O)I)IIT-
'rF~ll ItJ1~\TERSI1JLE ERROR BY Gl\r-
1 ~ ( ~ 1 x s'rit tTl, T I ON No. 1 ________________________ 6 
! :\ STRlTC'riON XO. 7 ---------------------------------------- 6, 7 
P<>I ~T I I. 'rHE 'rRIAL COURT C0)l)IIT-
TJ1:Il ltJ1: \'"ERSIBLE ERROR IN RE-
I~,t;Sl~(~ TO I~STRUCT THE JURY 
<>X TilE '"fHEORlr OF LAST CLEAR 
C'II .. \ Xl'1E ---------------------------------------------------- I~, 15 
C(>XCL LTSIO::\'" -------------------------------------------------------- 19 
1\ t;'rHORI'riES CI'fED 
CASES 
Covington~ etc. Y. Carpenter, 4 Utah 2d 378, 294 
}"> • 2 ( l 7 8 8 . --. ----. ----. -----. ----... --. -... -. -- --. -----. --------. -------- 14 
(;raluun Y. Johnson, 109 lTtah 346, 166 P.2d 230 ______ I7 
llayden Y. l'1ederlund~ I Utah 2d 171, 263 P.2d 796 .. I~ 
llerald v. Smith~ ,t')6 l T tah 304, 190 P. 932 ________________ 9 
l~a\\·aguchi Y. Bennett~ 112 Utah ~~2~ 189 P.2d 109 .. II 
:\Iann Y. Fairbourn~ I2 Utah 2d 342~ 366 P.2d 603.. 8 
)lorby Y. Rogers, 122 lTtah 540, 252 P.2d 23I .... 7, I6 
Saltas Y . .~.-\Jfleck. 99 Utah 281, 105 P.2d 176 ____________ 13 
\\rood"~ard Y. Spring Canyon Coal Co., 90 Utah 
578~ n:3 P.2d 267 ---------------------------------------------------- IO 
TEXTS 
77 ... -\.L.R.2d 917 ---------------------------------------------------------- 12 
1";4 ~\.L.R. 1084 and 1170 ---------------·-------------------------- 12 
17 4 ..:\.L.R. 1125 --·---------------------------------------------------·--- 1:3 
1 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
I>.i\l{ltEI_JIJ J. DONOHUE, ·~ 
Plaintiff-A ppcllfl!tl, I 
~ Case No. 
vs. i 10079 
Defendant-Respondent. .. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
srrA'fE~lEN'f OF KIND OF CASE 
'rhis is an action by plaintiff to recover for the 
wrongful death of his minor son resulting from a col-
lision bet,veen an automobile being driven by defendant 
and a bicycle ridden by decedent. 
DISPOSITIOX IN LO,VER COURT 
1.,he case "·as tried to a jury, and from a verdict 
and a judgment for defendant the plaintiff appeals. 
3 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON .t\.PPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the judgment and an 
order granting plaintiff a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff brought this action to recover damages 
for the death of his son resulting from the defendant 
running over the decedent, who at the time was riding 
his bicycle. From a judgment on a verdict in favor 
of defendant, No Cause of Action, plaintiff appeals. 
At approximately 11:45 A.M. on June 6, 1962, 
defendant was driving south in the west lane of traffic 
on Carbon County road No. 6441, in the City of Spring 
Glen, Carbon County, Utah. (R. 151). The road at 
the point where the accident happened is a blacktop 
straight road, with two unmarked lanes for north and 
southbound traffic. The paved portion of the highway 
is 21 feet wide with a 4-foot shoulder on the east and 
a 19-foot shoulder on the west. The road has a slight 
grade to the south. 'fhe area is residential with homes 
located on the west side of the road. (R. 134, 135}. 
The defendant was alone in her car and was driving 
to Price, Utah, to report to work. She had traveled a 
distance of approximately % of a mile when she sa·w 
three small children moving in a southerly direction 
along the west shoulder of the road. (R. 152, 153.) 
She estimated the children were approximately 2 feet 
off the paved portion of the road and noticed the first 
4 
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t•hild. a srnall girl. \Vas "·alking and the other t\\·o chil-
dren \\·ere riding bieyeles. "'\ccording to her testimony, 
upon seeing these children she reduced her speed from 
:!0 tniles per hour to 1.3 Iniles per hour. (l{. 15~-155.) 
I )efendant testified she passed the first t\\·o children 
without difficulty. After she had passed the second 
child. she noticed the third child was still riding his 
hil·yele on the gravel shoulder adjacent to the road. 
(It };)H.) Defendant testified she then heard a ''clang." 
She stepped on the brakes and turned to the left. After 
stopping the automobile she turned and saw the de-
ceased and his bicycle lying in the road. (R. 159, 160.) 
Defendant admitted she did not see the deceased 
in front of her ear prior to the point of impact. (R. 
I.>H.) She further admitted she failed to honk her horn 
at any time prior to the collision. (R. 156.) 
The n1inor son of plaintiff died within a few hours 
after the accident. (R. 175.) He was six and one-half 
years old. ( R. 173.) 
The investigating officer testified that when he 
arrived at the scene he found a bicycle lying in the west 
lane of traffic "·ith its front '"heel near the center of 
the road and pointing in an easterly direction. There 
\Vere approximately 6 feet 7 inches of gouge marks on 
the road to the north of the bicycle, the bicycle was 3 
feet south of the gouge n1arks. and 23 feet south of 
the bicycle and near the center of the road was a spot 
of blood. The officer estimated the point of impact 
5 
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was 6 feet north of the gouge marks and the auto-
mobile stopped 16 feet beyond the blood spot, having 
traveled a total distance of 54 feet after the impact. (R. 
136-138.) There were no skid marks. (R. 151.) (See 
Exhibit 1.) 
The investigating officer examined the vehicle be-
longing to the defendant and found a dent on the 
right hood and fragments of hair on the right head-
light. This damage was caused when the car struck 
the child. (R. 145.) 
The jury returned a verdict of No Cause of Action 
in favor of defendant and against plaintiff. (R. 75a.) 
Plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial (R. 76) which 
was denied by the court. (R. 80}. It is the judgment 
of No Cause of Action which is the subject of this 
appeal. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED RE-
VERSIBLE ERROR BY GIVING INSTRUC-
TION NO.7. 
Instruction No. 7 (R. 54) charges the jury as fol-
lows: 
"The deceased, Phillip Donohue, had a duty 
to use that degree of care which a reasona~ly 
prudent child of his age, understanding and In-
telligence as you find it would use: 
6 
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"1. 'ro select a course of tra Yel for his bicycle 
reasonably free of the hazard of getting into the 
eourse of a tnoving automobile on the highway; 
d~. 'ro observe and become a\vare of the pres-
ence and moYement of the Defendant's car upon 
the high"·ay and avoid colliding with the same. 
'"If you find by a fair preponderance of the 
e\·idence that the deceased violated his duty in 
one or more of the particulars above mentioned 
aiHI that his doing so \vas the sole proximate cause 
of his being struck by the Defendant's automo-
bile, or one of the contributing proximate causes 
of his being so struck, then you must find a ver-
dict in favor of the Defendant and against the 
Plaintiff, no cause of action." 
Plaintiff objects to the whole of said instructio11 
and to Yarious portions thereof, and respectfully sub-
tnits the giving of the instruction was reversible error. 
\Y. e contend the instruction is error because the court 
determined as a matter of law the standard of care 
required by this deceased child. We submit that in cases 
involYing the question of whether or not the conduct 
of a child constitutes contributory negligence, the 
standard of care 'vith which the child should be charged 
is a n1atter to be submitted to the jury. In support of 
this contention "·e refer the court to the following 
authorities: 
In Jlorby ·c. Rogers~ 122 Utah 540, 252 P.2d 231, 
the defendant attempted to have a child of 13 years 
declared to be contributorily negligent as a matter 
of la'v for violating a provision of the Motor 'T ehicle 
7 
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Code. In refusing to so hold, this Court stated at pages 
233 and 235, 252 P.2d: 
"The problem thus presented to us is whether 
the generally accepted rule as to consideration 
of an infant's age and capacity in determining 
the question of his negligence is to prevail over 
the rule establishing negligence as a matter of 
law upon violation of a statutory duty promul-
gated for his safety. We believe that it should. 
* * * 
"The fact that the rule prevailing in this juris-
diction that a law violation is negligence as a 
matter of law, does not overcome the rule that the 
contributory negligence of a child is to be deter-
mined according to the proper standard of care 
with which he is charged, does not mean that the 
statutory violation rule is nullified where children 
are involved. If the violation of a statute by a 
child is found to evidence less care than that which 
ordinarily could be expected of a child of the same 
age, intelligence, knowledge, and experience, he 
could be held contributorily negligent barring his 
recovery. On an issue of contributory negligence, 
this measuring and judging the accountability 
of children of immature age is ordinarily to be 
left to a jury as a question of fact about which 
there might be reasonable difference of opinion. 
The trial court did not err in so ruling." 
In Mann v. Fairbourn~ 12 Utah 2d 342, 366 P.2d 
603, plaintiff attempted to have the court rule that a 
child of 51h years was incapable of being charged with 
contributory negligence. With respect to this question, 
the Court stated as follows at page 606: 
8 
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··'rhe capacity or incapacity of a child is a 
factual inquiry and the test to be applied is that 
applicable to any other question of fact. If the 
trial judg·e. after a consideration of age, experi-
ence and ca pac1 ty of the child to understand and 
avoid the risks and dangers to which it "·as ex-
p< lse< I in the actual circumstances and situation 
of the case, deter1nines that fair-1ninded men 
n1ight honestly differ as to \vhether the child 
failed to exercise that degree of care that is usual-
ly exercised hy persons of similar age, experience 
and intelligence, the question of the child's con-
tributory negligence should be submitted to the 
jury. but if the trial judge determines that fair-
Blinded men could not conclude that the child 
had the capacity to be negligent, then he should 
decide the question of incapacity." 
In He rald v. Smith_, 56 Utah 304, 190 P. 932, 
the trial court directed a verdict against a 4-year-10-
-nlonth-old child on the ground the child 'vas contribu-
torily negligent as a matter of law. In reversing this 
decision the l~ourt stated as follows at pages 933 and 
~);3~: 
"The plaintiff 'vas a little girl four years and 
ten Inonths old. She was lawfully on the street 
at the time of the accident. The defendant's duty 
to the plaintiff cannot be measured by what he 
n1ight reasonably haYe expected to be the con-
duct of an adult person in such circumstances. 
It "~as his duty to avoid the accident if possible 
in the exercise of ordinary care, and it "·as for 
the jury to say "'"hether he .,"·as justified in assum-
ing that the plaintiff would do or might do the 
acts 'vhich the testimony shows she actually did . 
... -\ child of that age cannot, as a matter of la,v, 
9 
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be held to have appreciated the danger and is 
not presumed to conduct herself as an adult 
person would under similar circumstances. There 
is nothing in the record to indicate that the plain-
tiff had sufficient capacity to understand or ap-
preciate the danger to which she was exposed by 
the approach of the defendant's automobile. In 
fact, the contrary appears. 
" 'The degree of care required of a child 
must be graduated to its age, capacity, and ex-
perience, and must be measured by what might 
ordinarily be expected from a child of like age, 
capacity, and experience under similar condi-
tions. If it acted as might reasonably be ex-
pected of such a child, it cannot be charged with 
contributory negligence.' Gesas v. O.S.L.R.R., 
33 Utah 156, 93 P. 279, 13 L.R.A. (N.S.) 
1074." 
The case of Woodward v. Spring Canyon Coal Co.J 
90 Utah 578, 63 P.2d 267, involved the death of a 
child as the result of being struck by a car. From a 
judgment for plaintiff the defendant appealed. The 
case was reversed for an error concerning the court's 
instruction of the duty of the defendant driver, but the 
Court did comment on the instruction given concerning 
the duty of the deceased child. In this case the court 
instructed the jury as follows: 
"You are instructed that in determining 
whether the infant, Charles Franklin 'Voodward, 
was guilty of contributory negligence, you are 
to consider whether he was exercising that de-
gree of care and caution which a reasonably pru-
dent person of his age, general development, and 
10 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
nutturity should exercise under like circum-
s tnnces. It is the d u tv of children to exercise that 
degree of care to a,:oid injuries, which children 
of the satne age are accustomed to exercise under 
like eircun1stances and the maturity and capacity 
of the infant, his ability to understand and ap-
preciate the danger, and his familiarity with the 
surroundings in the particular case, are all mat-
ters to be taken into consideration in determining 
this question. 
'l'he Court stated: 
~' \ \r e find no error in giving of that instruction. 
One of the defenses interposed by the defendants 
"·as that the child, Charles Franklin Woodward, 
"·as negligent and that his negligence contribut-
ed to the injury which resulted in his death. It 
\vas proper that the jury should be instructed as 
to the nature and degree of care that the law 
imposed upon him." (Citing cases.) 
In the case of Kawaguchi v. Bennett_, 112 Utah 
-t4:?. 189 P.2d 109, the court was considering the ques· 
tion of 'vhether an 8-year-old child could be held con-
tributorily negligent. The Court reviewed and approved 
the trial court's instruction. That instruction is as fol-
lows: 
''The degree of care required of a child must 
be graduated to its age, capacity and experience, 
and must be measured by what might ordinarily 
be expected of a child of like age and capacity 
under similar conditions, and, if it acted as might 
reasonably be expected of such a child, it cannot 
be charged with contributory negligence. 
~'This instruction is in accord with our view 
expressed in Herald v. Smith, supra." 
11 
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See also 174 A.L.R. 1084 and 1170; 77 .~1.L.R. 
2d 917. 
Instruction No. 7 imposes on a six-year-old child 
a duty to exercise care first to select a course reasonably 
free of hazards; second to observe and become aware 
of defendant's car; and third to avoid colliding with 
defendant's car. '11 he basic fault with the instruction 
is that whether a six-year-old child in the exercise of 
ordinary care, under the facts of this case, would haYe 
observed or become aware of the car and taken any 
measures to avoid same are fact questions. The instruc-
tion imposes these duties as a matter of law. To para-
phrase the situation, in order to clarify the point, the 
trial court says the child must exercise the care of a 
child of his intelligence and age. But in the exercise 
of that care, he has a legal duty "to observe and become 
a'vare of ... defendant's car." What is more, the child 
had the additional duty to "avoid colliding with same." 
If the child had the legal duty of observing and avoid-
ing the car, plaintiff could not prevail because obviously 
the child did not a void the car. This instruction erro-
neously comments on the evidence, places the legal 
duty on the child of avoiding the car, and this is tanta-
mount to a directed verdict. The trial court might just 
as well have instructed the jury that the child was con-
tributorily negligent and that plaintiff should not be 
allowed to recover. As the authorities cited clearly indi-
cate, the only duty the child had was to comport himself 
in the 1nanner of a reasonably prudent six-year-old-
12 
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not to hu ve the eye of an eagle and the agility of an 
acrobat, as the instruction \vould seem to itnply. 
'l'he trial court in this case attempted to impose 
upon the decedent a standard of care that was too 
onerous even for an adult. Decedent was only six years 
of age and in many states it would be conclusively 
prcstnned that he was incapable of being guilty of 
contributory negligence. ( 17 4 A.L.R. at 1125). 
'fhe error in Instruction No. 7 is prejudicial and 
reversible. 
Language similar to that in the case at bar has 
been held by this Court to constitute reversible error. 
In Saltas v. Affleck) 99 Utah 281, 105 P.2d 176, 
this court co~sidered a similar instruction which pro-
vided as follows : 
"In this case it was the duty of the defendant 
Kenneth Butte to drive his automobile on said 
highway, using reasonable care and prudence 
so that he could avoid injuring anyone or col-
liding with any person on the highway.)) 
In ruling on the instruction this Court declared: 
"The instruction if followed practically in-
structed the jury that the defendant in addition 
to keeping a proper lookout and requiring the 
exercise of ordinary care and prudence having 
in consideration due vigilance commensurate 
\vith the circumstances and surroundings re-
quired him to use such care and prudence so that 
he could avoid colliding with anyone, regardless 
of "·hether such one were or were not guilty of 
negligence. 
13 
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''That part of the instruction failed to take 
into consideration the right of defendant to as-
sume that all other persons upon the high,vay 
would use ordinary care and reasonable precau-
tion for their own safety until the contrary ap-
peared.'' 
We also call attention to the fact that defendant's 
automobile overtook and struck the child from the rear. 
Instruction No. 7 imposes on the child the duty not 
only to observe defendant's automobile but to observe 
it as it approached from the rear. It is difficult to con-
ceive how much more onerous to plaintiff's case this 
instruction could become. 
This Court has on at least two occasions held that 
there is no legal duty of a traveler on the highway to 
keep himself apprised of traffic coming up on him from 
the rear-let alone imposing such a duty on a six-year-
old child. 
See Covington~ etc.~ v. Carpenter~ 4 Utah 2d 378, 
294 P.2d 788; Hayden v. Cederlund~ I Utah 2d 171, 
263 p .2d 796. 
Plaintiff respectfully submits that Instruction No. 
7 requires a reversal of this case. 
POINT II 
'l_,HE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED RE-
\TERSIBLE ERROR IN REFUSING TO IX-
14 
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S'l'ltlJlHL' TIIJ~ JUlt\r ON TilE 1"HEOR\?" 0~, 
L.\S'l' l 1 LEAlt CH..:\NCE. 
rhe tria} l'OUft refused plaintiff's request to haYe 
the jury instructed on the theory of last clear chance. 
l n revie,ving this ruling, the Court must now construe 
the evidence in the light 1nost favorable to the plaintiff. 
It '"ill be recalled that the defendant was the only 
witness "·ho testified as to the happening of this accident. 
She testified that as she proceeded in a southerly direc-
tion along the highway she first saw the deceased and 
two other children riding their bicycles along the 
shoulder of the highway; that the deceased was ahead 
of the other children. Defendant did not testify as to 
the exact distance in feet she was from the children 
'rhen she first saw them, but did describe the distance 
us being "from "·ay up on that corner." (R. 154.) De-
fendant further testified she reduced her speed from 
20 n1iles per hour to 15 miles per hour and guided her 
car closer to the center of the road. Defendant admitted 
the deceased 'vas within her vision at all times, but she 
did not once honk the horn of her car and warn the 
deceased of her approach. She did not claim by her testi-
mony that deceased was aware of her position on 
road prior to the collision. We contend the reasonable 
inference to be drawn from her entire testimony is that 
the deceased was evidently inattentive and unaware of 
her autotnobile and the impending danger. 
Plaintiff respectfully submits that under these 
circtunstances a JUry question was presented as to 
15 
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whether or not the defendant had the last clear chance 
to avoid this accident. In support of this contention we 
refer the court to the following citation: 
In the case of Morby v. Rogers_, supra, the defend-
ant sounded his horn approximately 200 feet from the 
bicycle rider but waited until he was within 20 feet be-
fore sounding it again. In affirming submission of the 
doctrine to the jury, the trial court stated as follows, at 
page 236: 
"Thus the matter was properly submitted to 
the jury, if the evidence, taken in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff, would reasonably sup-
port a finding (a) that the defendant knew of 
the plaintiff's situation of danger, and (b) real-
ized or had reason to realize that the plaintiff 
was inattentive and unlikely to discover his peril 
in time to avoid harm, and (c) the defendant 
thereafter was negligent in failing to utilize with 
reasonable care and competence his then existing 
ability to avoid harming the plaintiff." 
* * * 
"Sounding his horn: the defendant's own tes-
timony reveals that he was a "~are that the de-
ceased seemed to be oblivious to his approach. 
He did sound his horn at 200 feet but waited 
until within about 20 feet of the boy before 
sounding it again. Should we exclude the other 
safety factors above mentioned it seems that the 
jury could reasonably have found that a further 
\varning by the horn between those two distances 
1nay have enabled deceased to learn of defend-
ant .. 's approach and avoid the collision." 
16 
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In (;raluun ·c. ,/ohnson, 109 Utah 346, 166 P.2d 
~au, the trial court had directed a verdict in favor of 
defendant and against plaintiff minor child. In that 
case the defendant \vas driving her vehicle along a city 
street and s~nv the plaintiff minor child playing in the 
street. She did not sound her horn or stop her car prior 
to in1 pact. A friend of plaintiff shouted and warned 
him of the approach of the vehicle. In reversing the 
ruling of the trial court, this Court ruled as follows: 
"\\rhat we have really been considering is a 
rather unique application of the so-called last 
clear chance doctrine. Our discussion has dealt 
'vith a negligent omission of Darlene in not 
timely sounding her horn-an omission actuated 
by a worthy m~tive but which the jury could 
nevertheless find to be negligence. It has also 
been conceded that the boys were negligent in 
that they were in violation of the ordinance 
against playing in the street which ordinance was 
designed for their protection as well as for the 
expedition of traffic. Why then in this case does 
not the negligence of plaintiff bar recovery even 
though Darlene was negligent? The reason lies 
in the fact that in this situation the so-called hu-
manitarian doctrine of last clear chance applies." 
This court then made reference to the Restatement 
of 'forts on this subject and stated as follows: 
"Sec. 480 deals with the situation where the 
plaintiff "·as inattentive but had the ability, had 
he been alert, to avoid the oncoming danger to 
"·hich the defendant 'vas subjecting him. But 
in both cases the liability of the defendant arose 
because he failed to take the opportunity "vhich 
17 
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he alone had timely to avoid doing the plaintiff 
harm even though the plaintiff was negligent in 
getting himself in a position where he 'vas help-
less or because he was so inattentive that he was 
not alert to the approaching danger over "·hich 
defendant had control. And in both cases to hold 
the defendant liable it must plainly appear to 
the jury that defendant knew or reasonably 
should have known of plaintiff's helpless peril 
or of his inattention and after such realization 
or after he reasonably, had he been conducting 
himself with the vigilance required of him, should 
have known it, 'is negligent in failing to utilize 
with reasonable care and competence his then 
existing ability to avoid harming the plaintiff.' 
In the clear chance doctrine the plaintiff's negli-
gence has become in a sense fixed and realizable 
and on to this state of things defendant ap-
proaches on to the negligent plaintiff vvith and 
in control of the danger." 
In concluding the opinion, this Court stated: 
"In situations where reasonable minds must 
all come to the conclusion that a defendant had 
ample opportunity to utilize an existing ability 
to a void harm to the plaintiff the court should 
direct a verdict for the plaintiff; in situations 
where reasonable minds must all conclude that 
a defendant did not have such opportunity the 
verdict should be directed for the defendant. In 
those inter1nediate situations such as the suppo-
sition under the evidence that Darlene 'vas com-
ing do,vn on the far west side of the street where 
the court is in doubt as to whether all reasonable 
1ninds could conclude one wav or the other he 
should submit the case to the jury with instruc-
tions that it should be clearly convinced that the 
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defendant had a clear chance, viz., ample oppor-
tunity or clearly an existing ability at the time 
she reasonably should have appreciated the plain-
tiff's danger, to avoid harming him; otherwise 
it should find for the defendant." 
Defendant had ample opportunity to sound her 
horn and "·arn the deceased of her approach. The jury 
should haYe been per1nitted to determine whether or not 
she failed to exercise her last clear chance to a void the 
accident. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff respectfully submits the trial court com-
tnitted reversible error by the giving of Instruction 
X o. 7 and by refusing to instruct the jury on the theory 
of last clear chance. In view of said errors, this Honor-
able Court should reverse and remand the case for a 
ne\v trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
R . .L-\ ''rLINGS, ''r ALLACE, ROBERTS & 
BLACK 
S. V. LITIZETTE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
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